Onamae.com Desktop Cloud is a GMO Internet service that rents Windows desktops in the cloud. GMO's own notices make clear who used it: their first instructions are about trading tools such as MT4 and MT5 and the brokerage logins saved in them. On 20 October 2026 GMO found an unauthorised program on some customers' servers. By 04:00 the next morning every server on every plan was being shut down, and an extortion email had arrived demanding about 8 billion yen. By 24 October GMO was saying that customers' accounts at more than 70 securities and FX firms had seen unauthorised orders.

Most coverage leads with two numbers: 26,739 servers and US$50 million. Neither means quite what the headlines suggest. GMO published sixteen numbered notices by 29 October, and they are unusually frank about what is and is not established. This article follows those notices rather than the coverage.

[INFO]
Primary sources: GMO Internet Group's numbered notices on the incident (reports 2 to 15, 22 to 29 October 2026, in Japanese), read directly. The US$50 million figure and the 12:00 deadline wording are from Impress Watch, 27 October. Background on Japan's Active Cyber Defense law is from nippon.com. Translations are mine; quotes are given in Japanese where wording matters.
[INFO]
Update, 12 November 2026. At its first press conference on 2 November, GMO gave the intrusion timeline for the first time. The attacker got in on 5 August through a VPS of its own on the service, reached the management server on 17 August and pushed malware to customer VMs from 20 September to 14 October. GMO's own security company had flagged problems with the service in April 2024. Remote Desktop drive sharing was on by default, and GMO said it may have let the attacker take files from customers' own PCs. Losses from unauthorised trades will be paid in full; individual notices began on 6 November. Details in the new section below. The demo now puts you at a customer's PC.
◈ interactive artifact
Inside the Rented Desktop
A trader's home PC with the cloud desktop open: the trading terminal logged in, the home drive shared into the session. Step from 5 August to 6 November and watch the provider's side fill up. Every step says whether GMO's notices, its press conference or the attacker is the source.

//What Happened, in GMO's Words

A customer inquiry on 19 October started the investigation. On 20 October GMO confirmed "a third party's unauthorised program" on some customers' server environments and stopped new sign-ups and the control panel. At 04:00 on 21 October it began shutting down every plan's servers in sequence. From the 21st, customers reported activity in their trading accounts they did not recognise. GMO went to the police at 13:00 on 22 October.

What may have been taken, per the second notice: information stored on the servers, "取引ツールに保存されたお取引口座のログイン情報等を含みます" - including trading-account login details saved in trading tools. GMO says it holds no payment card data on these servers. Its first instruction to customers was to change trading-tool and trading-account passwords from a different device, end every active session, and turn on two-factor authentication where the broker offers it.

That is the shape of the attack as far as it can be described: a hosted desktop is only as safe as the credentials it remembers. A trading terminal left logged in on a rented server, with its password saved, is an account anyone on that server can trade.

//Update: What GMO Said on 2 November

Twelve days after disclosure, GMO Internet Group held its first press conference. According to ITmedia's and innovatopia's reports of it, the company gave this sequence. On 5 August the attacker obtained a VPS on the service as a customer and from there an administrator account. On 17 August it reached the management server that runs the customer VMs and took over administrator accounts. From 20 September to 14 October it used that server to distribute malware to customer VMs, up to the 26,739 already announced. GMO found out on 20 October, from a customer inquiry. It had not detected anything for about two and a half months.

The weakness was not new to the group. GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, a group company, diagnosed the service on 24 April 2024 and reported problems and points to improve. GMO said four rounds of emergency maintenance followed, the last on 20 May 2026, and that they "対策は十分ではなかった" - were not sufficient. CEO Masatoshi Kumagai said the findings never reached him, because there was no clear rule for what had to be escalated. GMO did not say whether the 2024 findings are the hole the attacker used.

The most important new detail is about customers' own computers. Remote Desktop can share the client's local drives into the session, and on this service that "ドライブ共有機能" was on by default. GMO said it may have let the attacker take files from the PCs customers connected from. That turns the attacker's threat about "customers' connected PCs", which this article treated as the main open question, into something GMO itself considers possible. It is still "may": GMO's analysis of customer machines is continuing, and it has not said that malware reached any of them.

On money: GMO will compensate losses from unauthorised trades in full, on top of the flat 5,000 yen and the published-data payments described below. Its 6 November notice says individual notices to affected customers began that day. Kumagai takes a 30% pay cut for three months, with smaller cuts for other executives, as reported by the Associated Press. The bounty site had 890 tips by 11 November, per the running count GMO keeps on its sixteenth notice.

//26,739 Is a Ceiling, Not a Count

The second notice gives "影響の可能性があるサーバー:26,739件" - servers that may be affected. The third notice spells out what that means: it is the number of servers that could have been targeted, not the number where unauthorised access or data theft was confirmed. Fifteen notices in, GMO has not published a confirmed count of compromised servers, affected customers, or unauthorised trades. Coverage that says 26,739 servers were breached is overstating what GMO has said.

//The Demand and the Threats

GMO's notices put the 21 October demand at "約80億円", about 8 billion yen. Impress Watch reported the figure as US$50 million, attributed to CEO Masatoshi Kumagai. According to GMO's fourth notice, the attacker threatened three things if GMO refused: keep placing unauthorised orders that drain customer balances at more than 70 firms; leak information about the service and about customers' connected PCs, and carry out ransomware attacks; and leak information about GMO's own systems.

GMO's answer, in the same notice: "当社は、攻撃者からの要求には応じません" - we will not comply with the attacker's demands. Its reasoning is the standard one: paying would not guarantee the data is deleted or stop it being misused.

Some reports say the demand was later cut to US$1 million, and that payment was asked for in Bitcoin or Ether. Neither appears in GMO's notices, and neither could be traced to a primary source here.

//27 October: A Deadline That Arrived Half-True

The attacker announced that at 12:00 on 27 October it would publish customer information and carry out a ransomware attack. GMO's ninth notice, at 11:52, told customers to back up, disconnect from the network, power off and unplug their PCs. The same notice said GMO's analysts had found no malware, ransomware included, on the customer machines they had finished examining. It did not say how many that was, and it said plainly that not every customer's machine had been confirmed safe.

At 12:30 GMO confirmed the attacker had published what it claimed was information about GMO and its customers. GMO's tenth notice says the material has not been verified and "事実と異なる内容が含まれるおそれがあります" - may contain content that is not true. It gives no count of customers in it. As of 13:55, no ransomware attack had been confirmed. On 28 October around 04:00, GMO confirmed the domain of the attacker's site had been suspended.

So the publication happened and the ransomware, so far, did not. The threat about customer PCs is the most important open question. The service is a remote desktop that customers connect to from their own computers, and the attacker claims it can reach those computers. When this was first written GMO had not said whether it believed that. On 2 November it said drive sharing may have let the attacker take files from those computers; its analysis is still running.

//The Bill

GMO's fourth notice commits to a flat 5,000 yen for every current customer, whether or not they lost money. It will also cover realised losses from trades it confirms were caused by the breach, including fees, but not market losses, lost profits or other indirect damage, and minus anything a broker refunds. The old system will not be restored. Customers who want a Windows desktop will be offered an alternative service on a separate cloud platform, free for six months, and only with their consent.

After the publication, the twelfth notice added a special payment for customers whose data GMO confirms was published, capped at 3 million yen per publication: 10,000 yen for basic details such as name and contact, 15,000 yen for account IDs, passwords and other financial or authentication data, and 25,000 yen for sensitive personal information, added together when several categories are exposed. It also announced a bounty of up to US$1 million for information on the attacker. The bounty site opened at noon on 28 October; by 11:30 on 29 October it had received 270 tips. The fifteenth notice says GMO's team has obtained information it considers "likely to identify the perpetrator" and passed it to the police that day.

//"Active Cyber Defense"

The most unusual line in the notices is in the fourth one. GMO says it has asked government agencies to take "国主導による攻撃基盤の追跡・遮断および無力化" - state-led tracking, blocking and neutralisation of the attack infrastructure - and calls its request the first invocation of active cyber defense. Japan's Active Cyber Defense Act, passed by the Diet on 16 May 2025, lets police and the Self-Defense Forces counter access to and neutralise computers used in attacks in a restricted range of urgent situations, under an independent supervisory board.

A company asking is not the same as the state acting. Nothing in GMO's notices says the government has used those powers here, and the suspension of the attacker's domain on 28 October is not attributed to anyone. Whether this case becomes the first real use of the law is worth watching. It is not established. At the 2 November press conference, as innovatopia reports it, active cyber defense had not been applied; Kumagai instead floated a "Cyber Aegis" idea of telecom providers quickly blocking malicious foreign IP addresses.

//If You Rent a Trading Desktop

From GMO's own instructions, which apply well beyond this service: change trading passwords from a device other than the hosted desktop; log out of every session at the broker, not just on the server; turn on two-factor authentication where offered; change any other credential saved on the server, and any password reused elsewhere; full-scan, not quick-scan, the computers you connected from; turn off drive sharing in your Remote Desktop client (in Windows' Remote Desktop Connection it is under Local Resources, then More) unless you need it for a specific transfer; keep browser sync off until you have checked those computers; and ignore anyone offering to recover lost money for a fee. GMO says it will never ask for passwords or authentication codes, other than read-only trading passwords for compensation checks.

[IOC]
Service: Onamae.com Desktop Cloud (お名前.com デスクトップクラウド), GMO Internet
Found: 20 October 2026; all servers shut down from 04:00 JST 21 October
Scope: 26,739 servers may be affected (population at risk, not confirmed access)
Data at risk: data stored on the servers, including trading-account logins saved in trading tools
Downstream: unauthorised orders at more than 70 securities and FX firms
Demand: about 8 billion yen (US$50 million per the CEO); GMO refuses
Published: 27 October 12:30 JST, unverified by GMO; no ransomware confirmed
Entry point (press conference, 2 November): a VPS obtained on the service as a customer (5 August), then the management server and its administrator accounts (17 August); the vulnerability itself not disclosed
Spread: malware distributed to customer VMs from the management server, 20 September to 14 October
Customer PCs: Remote Desktop drive sharing on by default; GMO says local files may have been taken

//Sourcing and Uncertainty

Everything about the timeline, scope, data, threats, refusal, compensation, bounty, terminal analysis, publication and the active cyber defense request is from GMO's notices, read on 29 October: reports 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15. The US dollar figure for the demand and its attribution to the CEO are from Impress Watch. The description of the Active Cyber Defense Act is from nippon.com.

Not used. Secondary reports of a reduced US$1 million demand, of payment in Bitcoin or Ether, and of GMO's share price could not be traced to a primary source and are left out, apart from noting the first two exist. Several English-language outlets returned HTTP 403 and were not relied on.

The update section is from GMO's 2 November press conference as reported by ITmedia (two articles, read on 12 November) and innovatopia, and from GMO's sixteenth notice and 6 November notice, read directly. The pay cut is from the Associated Press. The same AP report says GMO cited "more than 26,000 cases" and that the attackers deployed ransomware; both conflict with GMO's own notices (26,739 is servers at risk, and no ransomware was confirmed), so neither is used.

What is unknown. Which vulnerability gave the attacker administrator access, whether it is the one flagged in 2024, what the unauthorised program is, how many servers and customers were actually compromised, how much was traded or lost, whether any customer PC was reached, and how much of the published material is genuine. GMO says it is investigating the intrusion route with a security firm. The site does not attribute incidents to named individuals, and nothing here does.