goxlr.live looks like the home page of GoXLR Utility, the open-source app streamers use to control TC-Helicon's GoXLR mixers. It links to the project's real GitHub repository and its real Discord server. It offers six downloads. Five of them are the project's own release files, byte for byte. The sixth, the Windows installer, runs a stealer first and the genuine installer second, so the victim ends up with a mixer app that works.

We downloaded every file on 23 October 2026, compared each one with the hashes GitHub publishes for the official release, and took the Windows file apart without running it. This is what it does, why the usual name for it is probably wrong, and what to do if you installed it.

[INFO]
Method: all six downloads hashed and compared with the GoXLR Utility v1.2.4 release on GitHub; the Windows archive examined statically (archive listing, PE headers, setup script, strings, the packaged JavaScript). Nothing was executed and the exfiltration endpoints were not contacted. Domain, hosting and certificate details are from RDAP, the RIPE database, DNS and certificate transparency, re-checked the same day.
◈ interactive artifact
Spot the Fake Installer
A streamer's Windows desktop, in five stages: the fake download page and a hash check in PowerShell, the ZIP, Task Manager as the stealer runs first, Discord being rewritten, and the real app working as cover. Files, hashes and strings are from our own analysis.

//Five Real Files and One That Isn't

The official v1.2.4 release, published on 23 February 2026, has six assets: a Debian package, two RPMs, two macOS packages and a Windows .exe. goxlr.live's Linux and macOS downloads match GitHub's published SHA-256 values exactly. Its Windows download is goxlr-utility-1.2.4.zip, a file the project has never published. Five full re-downloads with different browsers and fresh sessions all returned the same file, so the site is not handing different people different payloads.

Inside the ZIP is one file named goxlr-utility-1.2.4.exe, the official installer's exact name. It is 70.6 MB against the official 45.7 MB, a 64-bit program where the official one is 32-bit, and it has seven executables embedded in it. Neither the real installer nor the fake one carries a code signature, so Windows shows the same unknown-publisher warning for both. A user who clicks through one has no reason not to click through the other.

//What the Installer Does First

The fake installer is a WinRAR self-extracting archive. Its setup script unpacks everything to %TEMP% and then runs two programs in order: goxlr-assets.exe, then goxlr-utility-1.2.4.exe. The second one is the genuine installer, identical to GitHub's. The first is the stealer.

That order is the design. By the time the familiar setup window appears, the stealer has already run, and what follows is a normal install of the app the victim wanted. There is no error, no missing feature, nothing to report to anyone.

//The Payload

goxlr-assets.exe (58.6 MB) is a Node.js 18 program bundled into a single executable with vercel/pkg. Its package.json calls it "Official GoXLR Utility", author TC-Helicon, version 1.2.5: one version ahead of the project's latest release, so it reads as an update. Its dependencies are the tell. @primno/dpapi decrypts secrets Windows protects for the logged-in user, which is how Chromium browsers store saved passwords and cookie keys. sql.js reads SQLite databases, which is what those browser stores are. ffi-napi makes native Windows calls. Strings in the binary refer to wallets, including Exodus.

The largest piece is a 22,703-byte script it places inside the Discord desktop client. Once there, it takes the account's session token from Discord's own web code, watches logins, password changes, MFA and new registrations, and blocks Discord's QR-code login gateway (wss://remote-auth-gateway). That block is not about stopping the victim signing in; it stops them revoking the stolen session the easy way, by scanning a QR code from a phone they still control, so the attacker's hold on the account outlasts a casual logout. It then loads a further stage, core.asar, which we did not analyse. A dispatcher name, usrvc.exe, also appears in the payload's strings, which points to a persistence component we did not see run.

The script also watches two payment endpoints: a Braintree path ending merchants/49pp2rp4phym7387/.../paypal_accounts, and Stripe's card tokenisation. Our first-pass notes described that merchant as the attacker's and the capture as covering "any site". Both are wrong. 49pp2rp4phym7387 is the end of the Braintree key Discord publishes in its own web client. The stealer is watching Discord's billing screens: anyone who adds a card or PayPal account to Discord on an infected machine, for Nitro for example, hands it over. It does not reach payments made on other sites.

Everything goes out through two webhooks: a Discord webhook on canary.discord.com (ID 1561303346374246441) and a backup at cafebabe.cc/api/webhooks/ (ID 179231388932405535). A webhook is a URL anyone holding it can post to, so the stolen data lands in a Discord channel and the traffic looks like Discord. The backup host is not a neutral third party: cafebabe.cc resolves to 85.11.167.82, the same server that hosts goxlr.live, so the fallback channel is the operators' own co-located box. The payload also looks up the victim's public IP through api.ipify.org and icanhazip.com, and references an image on Pinterest's CDN (i.pinimg.com). We logged that as a beacon; it may simply be the picture attached to the webhook messages.

//Is This SantaStealer?

The payload calls itself Santa. Its build path is /snapshot/chaos stealer/Bot/temp_builds/santa-LIFETIME-0FA7C3253B49/index.js, internal functions are named __santaRun and __santa_el, and the injected Discord script signs off Prv | @Santa. The obvious label is SantaStealer, the malware-as-a-service stealer Rapid7 documented in December 2025.

It does not fit. Rapid7's SantaStealer is written in C, loads its modules in memory, and sends stolen data to its own server on port 6767. This sample is JavaScript in a Node.js wrapper that injects into Discord and posts to webhooks. They share a word, not a code base, as far as anything public shows. "LIFETIME" reads like a licence tier and "chaos stealer" like the builder kit's own name, but neither ties it to a known family. We are calling it what it demonstrably is: a Node.js Discord-injection stealer branded Santa.

//The Site

goxlr.live was registered through Dynadot on 10 September 2026 with the owner's details redacted. A Let's Encrypt wildcard certificate followed the next day, and the certificate it serves now was issued on 15 September. It resolves to 85.11.167.82 in 85.11.167.0/24, a block registered with RIPE on 5 June 2026 to TechTies Inc., an organisation with a Seychelles address created two weeks before that. The server is IIS 10 and serves the download over HTTP as well as HTTPS.

//How People Find It

The person who pointed us at goxlr.live says its operators buy search ads so the site appears above the real project when people search for the GoXLR app. That is their account, and we have not been able to confirm it. Google's Ads Transparency Center showed no ads pointing to goxlr.live in any region when we checked on 23 October. That does not rule it out: an ad can point at a different domain that forwards visitors on, it can run on another ad network, and it may already have been taken down.

What we can see is consistent with it. The domain carries a Google site-verification record, which is what you add to use Google Search Console or Google Ads with a domain. On its own that proves nothing about how visitors arrive. If you have seen a sponsored result leading to this site, a screenshot showing the ad and the date would settle it.

The ZIP was last modified on 22 October, the day before our download, and was unchanged when we checked again. GoXLR Utility has no official website: the repository's homepage field is empty, and goxlr.app, the obvious alternative, does not answer and has no link to the project. That gap is what a site like this fills. The only trustworthy download is the GitHub releases page.

//What We Did About It

We have reported the campaign to the parties that can act on it: Discord's Trust & Safety team, for the two exfiltration webhooks; Dynadot, the registrar that holds goxlr.live; the hosting contacts for 85.11.167.0/24 (TechTies, abuse abuse@tech-ties.net), which carries both goxlr.live and the cafebabe.cc relay; and Let's Encrypt, whose certificate the site uses. None of that is instant, and the site was still serving the file when this went up, so the guidance below assumes it is live. The one durable fix is on the project's side: GoXLR Utility has no official website and publishes no checksums or signatures, which is the exact gap a site like this fills.

//If You Installed It

If you installed GoXLR Utility on Windows from goxlr.live, assume the machine and the accounts used on it are compromised, even though the app works. In this order, and from a different device where it says so:

1. From another device, change your Discord password and turn on two-factor authentication. Changing the password ends the session the stolen token belongs to. Do not change it on the infected machine: the injected script watches password changes.
2. From another device, change your email password, then every password saved in any browser on that PC.
3. Move any cryptocurrency from wallets used on that PC to a new wallet with a new seed phrase.
4. If you ever added a card or PayPal account to Discord on that PC, check the statements and tell the card issuer.
5. Reinstall Windows. Deleting goxlr-assets.exe does not remove the change to Discord, and the next stage was not analysed.
6. Install GoXLR Utility again from the project's GitHub releases page.

[IOC]
Download: https://goxlr.live/downloads/goxlr-utility-1.2.4.zip (also over HTTP)
ZIP SHA-256: 5822dee5d9daa2b20db2e93d090591048c11f176fc34303e18fc53758f31a4c5 (70,244,793 bytes)
Dropper SHA-256: 3515d86cf7bfae6d204a436124f3de43f9988650459b5cac4f78a9fdefdc3bef (70,551,177 bytes, WinRAR SFX)
Stealer: %TEMP%\goxlr-assets.exe (58,564,606 bytes, vercel/pkg); build tag santa-LIFETIME-0FA7C3253B49
Genuine installer, do not block: 0a8743d27ea5d1741956aecfc3ae26c0f7399945cf29d2bb6b3dab459e86ac2f
Host: goxlr.live, www.goxlr.live and cafebabe.cc all on 85.11.167.82 (block 85.11.167.0/24)
Exfiltration: Discord webhook 1561303346374246441 on canary.discord.com; backup cafebabe.cc/api/webhooks/179231388932405535
Blocked by the payload: wss://remote-auth-gateway (Discord QR re-authentication)
Lookups from a non-browser process: api.ipify.org, ipv4.icanhazip.com; referenced: i.pinimg.com
Host artefacts: a modified Discord core index.js; dispatcher name usrvc.exe; strings __santaRun, __santa_el, Prv | @Santa

//Sourcing and Uncertainty

The file hashes, sizes, setup script, dependencies, strings and the decoded Discord script are from our own static analysis on 23 October 2026. The official hashes are GitHub's. Registration, hosting and certificate details are from RDAP, the RIPE database, DNS and crt.sh, checked the same day. The SantaStealer comparison is from Rapid7's write-up and Malpedia's entry. That the Braintree key is Discord's is from copies of Discord's public page configuration.

What is not known. Nothing was run, so persistence, anti-analysis checks and the core.asar stage are unobserved, and the order of events in the demo is reconstructed from the setup script and code. How victims reach the site is not confirmed: paid search ads are our source's account and fit what we can see, but no ad has been found. The stealer's full hash was not recorded, so the ZIP and dropper hashes are the ones to block. The payload can change at any time; the ZIP's ETag "e177592d1c62dd1:0" and its Last-Modified date will change when it does.