In the first two weeks of November 2026 five hosting providers were hit, and a sixth had just told customers it had been. Shortly after 02:00 Moscow time on 2 November, attackers inside Beget's management servers launched malware built to delete data, and Russia's second-largest .RU registrar lost its entire cloud. Within about an hour, someone pushed a poisoned update through cPGuard to about 2,950 hosting servers. Mittwald found an intruder in its AI-assistant interface on 4 November. ESTT's cloud was encrypted on 8 November and ActiveCloud's on 10 November. DreamHost had published its own notice on 29 October.

Nobody has linked these attacks to each other, and they are not one campaign. They are three different kinds of attack - destroy, encrypt, steal access - landing on the same kind of target in the same fortnight. For anyone who rents hosting, each teaches something different about what the host can and cannot protect for you.

[INFO]
Sources, read 14 November 2026: Beget's incident timeline as reported by The Record (4 November), Habr and CNews; The Moscow Times on ESTT (9 November); The Record on ActiveCloud; Mittwald's status page; Help Net Security on cPGuard; and this site's earlier articles on cPGuard, DreamHost and Mittwald, which carry their own sources. Russian-language reports were translated by this site.
◈ interactive artifact
One Bad Fortnight for Hosts
Six providers on one status board for 1 to 13 November 2026. Pick one, then pick how you back up your site, and see what survives a wiper, ransomware or credential theft.

//Destroy: Beget

Beget's own timeline, repeated by several outlets: about 02:00 Moscow time on 2 November the attackers got into the management servers; at 02:30 they started malware designed to delete data from the servers; at about 02:40 Beget noticed; at 02:55 it disconnected every server from the network. The first customer notice went out on Telegram at about 04:50.

The Record reports that the attackers reached the systems that manage Beget's infrastructure and ran scripts that erased data tied to virtual servers, cloud storage and Kubernetes. All binary backups of the virtual servers were lost; file-level backups survived, and Beget later said they would be available to only about half of its VPS users. More than 1,000 servers had to be checked by hand before going back online. Beget says it found no sign that data was downloaded or altered: the aim was destruction. It told customers the attack may count as force majeure under Russian law. RBC put the number of affected online resources at about 500,000.

The damage did not stop at the servers. The Coordination Center for .RU/.РФ withdrew Beget's registrar accreditation as of 3 November, so it can no longer register new .ru and .рф domains or take transfers, though it must keep serving the domains it already holds (CNews). On 11 November Beget said it had restored more than 50,000 shared-hosting sites, about half the job. No one has claimed the attack. Beget has not said how the attackers got in. The Record notes the context: Russian infrastructure firms face growing numbers of cyberattacks and drone strikes, and the EU sanctioned Beget earlier in 2026 for hosting services to Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine.

//Encrypt: ESTT and ActiveCloud

ESTT, a Russian cloud host, said on 8 November that file-encrypting malware had disrupted its cloud. By the next day it said about 90% of customers' virtual servers were back, though account dashboards stayed down, and that it had found no sign of customer data leaking (The Moscow Times).

ActiveCloud, which serves businesses in Belarus and Russia, was hit early on 10 November. Ransomware encrypted part of its cloud and took down its main hosting platform, its hardened hosting service, corporate mail, its website and every support channel. Local outlets reported that customers could not restore from backups themselves during recovery, and that some machines did not boot afterwards. ActiveCloud said its main services were back on 13 November and that it found no evidence of data theft. It has not said whether a ransom was demanded (The Record).

//Steal: cPGuard, Mittwald and DreamHost

The other three destroyed nothing and took access instead. At cPGuard, fake updates uploaded between 02:04 and 02:09 UTC on 2 November ran as root on about 2,950 customer servers and collected password hashes, root SSH keys and cloud storage keys (full article). At Mittwald, a flaw in the MCP server that connects AI assistants to the hosting platform let an attacker read session tokens and enter 56 customer projects (full article). At DreamHost, an intruder on the web File Manager collected FTP and SFTP passwords for about ten weeks (full article). In all three the customers were fine the next morning, as far as they could see. The damage is whatever someone later does with what was taken.

//What Each Kind Teaches

A wiper tests whether your backup is really yours. Beget's VPS backups lived in the same infrastructure, run by the same management plane, as the servers they protected. When that plane was taken over, the backups went too. A backup the host keeps for you protects against your mistakes and its disk failures; it does not protect against an attacker who controls the host. Only a copy held somewhere else, under credentials the host never sees, survives that.

Ransomware tests whether you can restore without the host. ActiveCloud's backups may well have survived, but customers could not reach them while the provider recovered. Having a copy is half of it; the other half is a practised way to bring the site up somewhere else, with DNS you control and can repoint.

Credential theft tests whether you know what the host can see. No backup helps when nothing was destroyed. What helps is a list of every secret the provider, its agent or its web tools could reach - hosting passwords, SSH keys, database passwords in config files, API keys in environment variables - so that you can rotate all of them in an afternoon when the notice comes.

//A Checklist for Anyone Renting Hosting

Keep at least one backup outside your host, under an account the host has no access to, and test restoring it to a different provider at least once. Keep your domain at a registrar separate from your host, so that the host failing (or losing its accreditation, like Beget) does not trap your DNS. Keep a written list of the secrets your hosting can see, and how to rotate each. Turn on two-factor authentication everywhere the host offers it. And read your host's status page and notices when they come: in every one of these cases the provider told customers what to do, and the advice was specific.

[IOC]
Beget (Russia): wiper via the management plane, ~02:00-02:55 MSK 2 Nov; VPS, S3, Kubernetes data and VPS binary backups lost; registrar accreditation withdrawn 3 Nov; unclaimed
cPGuard / OPSShield: poisoned updates 02:04-02:09 UTC 2 Nov; ~2,950 servers ran them as root
Mittwald (Germany): MCP server token theft from 27 Oct; found 4 Nov; 56 projects; second wave via the website 12 Nov
ESTT (Russia): file-encrypting malware 8 Nov; ~90% of VPS back 9 Nov
ActiveCloud (Belarus): ransomware 10 Nov; main services back 13 Nov
DreamHost (US): File Manager intrusion about Aug to 23 Oct; notice 29 Oct
Links between incidents: none established by any source

//Sourcing and Uncertainty

Beget's timeline is from its own statement as carried by The Record, Habr and other outlets; the 500,000 figure is RBC's via The Moscow Times; the accreditation is from CNews; the restoration figures are from Beget's 11 November update on Habr. ESTT is from The Moscow Times; ActiveCloud from The Record and Reform.news. The cPGuard, Mittwald and DreamHost details are from this site's articles on each, which cite their primary sources. The lessons and checklist are this site's.

What is unknown. Who attacked Beget, ESTT and ActiveCloud, and how they got in; whether any of them are linked (the near-simultaneous start of Beget and cPGuard is a coincidence until someone shows otherwise); and how many customer sites were lost for good.