On 3 October 2026 an attacker began running commands as root on an Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance that was fully patched. Volexity, which found it on a customer's network, tracks the attacker as UTA0576. Three separate bugs made that possible. Ivanti fixed one of them on 13 October and the other two on 29 October, and CISA added the last two to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 30 October. So anyone who patched promptly on 13 October was running a build CISA still lists as affected for another sixteen days.

This article is about that gap, and about the two things the chain shows: individually modest scores can add up to unauthenticated root, and on this appliance the attacker left almost nothing on disk to find.

[INFO]
Primary sources: Volexity's report, 13 October 2026, with its 29 October update; CISA's alert urging patching (13 October, revised for the 30 October KEV additions). Fixed builds and per-CVE scores as summarised by Secure.com on 31 October from Ivanti's advisory, which did not render for us. Ivanti's own advisory is the authority for versions; check it before acting.
◈ interactive artifact
Which Links Are Still Open?
The appliance's own console: pick a build, run the Integrity Checker and get a clean result that clears nothing, see which of the three chained bugs are open, and catch Volexity's request pattern in the reverse-proxy log.

//Three Bugs, Three Scores, One Result

Volexity describes the chain in three steps.

Get in - CVE-2026-104935. A request to the public page welcome.cgi could carry an X-DSCGI-PATH header naming a different CGI file, and the appliance routed by the header. That reached protected scripts without logging in. One of them, the upload handler wu.cgi, wrote a file to disk before checking that it was a valid ZIP archive, and the attacker ran it in the gap before it was deleted. Ivanti tracked both of those under one CVE, rated 8.6.

Know where the file lands - CVE-2026-118527. Uploads were written to a predictable path, /home/runtime/tmp/ followed by the MD5 of the filename. Ivanti scores it 4.3 and CISA describes it as needing an authenticated attacker. In the chain, the first bug supplied the authentication.

Become root - CVE-2026-111357. The privileged broker dsinvoked trusted configuration data in DSCache. Ivanti scores it 8.8; the CVE record gives 7.0 under CVSS 3.1 and calls it local. The attacker patched the in-memory copy of /home/lib/libdsplibs.so inside the cgi-server process to change a DSCache entry, so that an existing maintenance task (updateOpswatSDK) launched a Perl script of the attacker's as root. Then the exploit put the entry and the library back.

Read alone, those are an 8.6, a 4.3 that needs a login and a local escalation. Together, Volexity says, they gave root to someone who never logged in. This site has covered the same problem before, from the other side: one bug with two official scores. A severity score describes one bug. It cannot describe what the bug does once another one has already done its part.

//Why Patching on 13 October Was Not Enough

The 13 October releases fixed the entry point. The victim had been on 22.8R2.4, "fully patched at the time" in Volexity's words, and 22.8R2.5 closed CVE-2026-104935. The other two links stayed open until 29 October, when Ivanti shipped 22.8R2.6 and 25.1.1.3. CISA's revised alert lists 25.1.1.2 and prior, 25.1.2.2 and prior, and 22.8R2.5 and prior as affected. The fixed 25.1.2 build was not confirmed in the sources we could read; check Ivanti's advisory.

Does a 22.8R2.5 appliance still have a remote path in? Without the entry bug, the two remaining ones need an authenticated attacker or local access, and no source reviewed here says another way in has been seen. But both are on the KEV list for exploitation, Ivanti published no workaround for either, and Secure.com reported on 31 October that it had found no released scanner check for them. Federal agencies had until 2 November for CVE-2026-111357, with forensic triage required under CISA's BOD 26-04, and until 13 November for CVE-2026-118527. Ivanti 22.8 reaches end of life on 31 January 2027.

//Almost Nothing Left on Disk

Volexity found no web shell and no backdoor. Commands and their results travelled inside the exploit's own HTTPS requests. The root step happened in memory and was undone. The attacker truncated and rewrote the Ivanti debug log and the Linux audit log, deleted temporary scripts and suppressed output. Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool did not detect the compromise; CISA says it may miss exploitation because commands run in memory. Volexity found the activity through network monitoring and then memory and core-dump analysis.

What the attacker did with root is the reason this matters beyond the appliance. Volexity lists:

the domain credentials the appliance stores for LDAP, plus its authentication configuration and usernames parsed from local logs;
custom tools that queried Active Directory for LAPS administrator passwords, BitLocker recovery information and attributes that hold passwords (userPassword, unixUserPassword);
Kerberos tooling with Kerberoasting, and password spraying;
a renamed tcpdump, running as dsstatmond from /data/.icscap/, capturing plaintext protocol traffic, with a helper script pulling credentials out of the captures.

Volexity is highly confident the attacker was preparing to move further into the network, and has low confidence that the motive was criminal rather than espionage, based on the target. It assesses with medium confidence that the attacker used large language models to build the exploits and post-exploitation tools.

//What to Do

Upgrade to 22.8R2.6 or 25.1.1.3 or later. A 22.8R2.5 box is not done.
Do not treat a clean Integrity Checker result as a clean appliance. If the appliance faced the internet in October, assume it could have been reached.
Recover the way CISA and Ivanti describe: back up the configuration, factory reset (or rebuild a virtual or cloud instance), upgrade, restore the configuration. Then reset domain, administrator and local account passwords, revoke and reissue stored certificates, and reset stored API keys and license server credentials.
Go past the appliance. Rotate the LDAP service account it uses. Treat LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys readable by that account as exposed. Look for Kerberoasting and spraying from the appliance's address, and for lateral movement out of it.

[IOC]
CVEs: CVE-2026-104935 (auth bypass + upload race, 8.6, KEV 13 Oct), CVE-2026-118527 (predictable upload path, 4.3, KEV 30 Oct, due 13 Nov), CVE-2026-111357 (dsinvoked trusts DSCache, 8.8 Ivanti / 7.0 CVE record, KEV 30 Oct, due 2 Nov)
Affected (CISA): 25.1.1.2 and prior, 25.1.2.2 and prior, 22.8R2.5 and prior. Fixed: 25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6
HTTP (Volexity): high volume to /dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi; X-DSCGI-PATH values such as /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi or /home/runtime/tmp/<MD5(filename)>; a mismatch between URL path and that header
Process: dsstatmond running from /data/.icscap/
Files: /data/.icscap/h.py, /data/.icscap/cap*, /tmp/ml.py, /tmp/rq5.py, /tmp/mk.py, /tmp/rr.py, /tmp/pu.txt, /tmp/sp_out.txt, /tmp/spray_hits.json, /home/runtime/tmp/ics-root-run-inband-*.pl, /home/runtime/tmp/ics-root-result-inband-*
Network: 108.165.147[.]64 (VPS that ran an OpenVPN server, 30 Sep to 7 Oct). Volexity publishes further indicators on its GitHub.

//Sourcing and Uncertainty

The chain mechanics, the victim's build, the timeline, the post-exploitation activity, the anti-forensics, the detection guidance, the indicators and the confidence levels are from Volexity's report and its 29 October update. The affected-version list, the Integrity Checker caveat, the recovery steps and the 22.8 end-of-life date are from CISA's alert. The 30 October KEV additions, deadlines and forensic-triage requirement are from CISA's KEV entries as reported. The fixed builds 22.8R2.6 and 25.1.1.3, the CVSS 4.3 and 8.8 scores, the 7.0 CVE-record score and the scanner gap are from Secure.com's 31 October summary of Ivanti's advisory. Ivanti's advisory page did not render when we tried to read it, so its exact wording is not quoted here.

What is unknown. How many appliances were hit; Ivanti has been reported as saying a limited number of customers, but we could not read its advisory to confirm the wording. Who UTA0576 is; Volexity does not name a country or group, and neither does this article. Whether the chain's second and third bugs have been used without the first. The fixed build for the 25.1.2 line.